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Abstract
We analyse the Tangle — a DAG-valued stochastic process where new ver-
tices get attached to the graph at Poissonian times, and the attachment’s loca-
tions are chosen by means of random walks on that graph. These new vertices,
also thought of as “transactions”, are issued by many players (which are the
nodes of the network), independently. The main application of this model is
that it is used as a base for the IOTA cryptocurrency system [1]. We prove
existence of “almost symmetric” Nash equilibria for the system where a part
of players tries to optimize their attachment strategies. Then, we also present
simulations that show that the “selfish” players will nevertheless cooperate with
the network by choosing attachment strategies that are similar to the “recom-
mended” one.
Keywords: random walk, Nash equilibrium, directed acyclic graph, cryp-
tocurrency, tip selection, IOTA
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the Tangle, a stochastic process on the space of (rooted)
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). This process “grows” in time, in the sense that
new vertices are attached to the graph according to a Poissonian clock, but no ver-
tices/edges are ever deleted. When that clock rings, a new vertex appears and at-
taches itself to locations that are chosen with the help of certain random walks on
the state of the process in the recent past (this is to model the network propagation
delays); these random walks therefore play the key role in the model.
Random walks on random graphs can be thought of as a particular case of Random
Walks in Random Environments: here, the transition probabilities are functions of the
graph only, i.e., there are no additional variables, such as conductances1 etc., attached
to the vertices and/or edges of the graph. Still, this subject is very broad, and one can
find many related works in the literature. One can mention the internal DLA models
(e.g. [13] and references therein), random walks on Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs [5, 13], or
random walks on the preferential attachment graphs [4], which most closely resembles
the model of this paper.
The motivation for studying the particular model presented in this paper stems
from the fact that it is applied in the IOTA cryptocurrency [1, 20]. The IOTA is
an ambitious project started in 2015, it aims to provide a globally scalable system
capable of processing payments and storing data. One of its distinguishing features
is that it uses (nontrivial) DAGs as the primary ledger for the transactions’ data2.
This is different from “traditional” cryptocurrencies such as the Bitcoin, where that
data is stored in a sequence of blocks3, also known as blockchain. An important
observation, which motivates the use of more general DAGs instead of blockchains is
that the latter scale poorly. Indeed, it is not hard to see that the chain of blocks of
finite size, which can only be produced at regular discrete time intervals, produces a
throughput bottleneck and leads to high transaction fees that need to be paid to the
miners (which is by design). Also, when the network is large, it is difficult for it to
achieve consensus on which blocks are “valid” in the situations when the new blocks
come too frequently. If one wants to remove the fees and allow the system to scale,
the natural idea would thus be to eliminate the bottleneck and the miners.
This is, of course, easier said than done — it raises all sorts of new questions.
Where should the next block/transaction/vertex be attached? Who will vet the
1this refers to the well-known relation between reversible Markov chains and electric networks,
see e.g. the classical book [7]
2we also cite [2, 3, 17, 22] which deal with other approaches to using DAGs as distributed ledgers
3that is, the underlying graph is essentially Z+ (after discarding finite forks)
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transactions for consistency and why? How can it be secure against possible attacks?
How will consensus be achieved? These questions do not have trivial answers. The
paper [20] presented an idea for an architecture which could potentially resolve these
issues. In that system, each transaction, represented by a vertex in the graph, would
approve two previous transactions it selects using a particular class of random walks.
To eliminate the transaction fees, it was necessary to first eliminate the miners—
after all, if one wants to design a feeless system, there cannot be a dichotomy of
“miners” who serve the “simple users”. This bifurcation of roles between the miners
and transactors naturally leads to transaction fees because the miners have some
kind of resource that others do not have and they will use this monopoly power to
extract rents, in the form of transaction fees, or block rewards, or both. Therefore, to
eliminate the fees, all the users would have to fend for themselves. The main principle
of such a system would be “help others, and others will help you”.
You can help others by approving their transactions; others can help you by
approving your transactions. Let us call “tips” the transactions which do not yet
have any approvals; all new-coming transactions are tips at first. The idea is that,
by approving a transaction, you also indirectly approve all its “predecessors”. It is
intuitively clear that, to help the system progress, the incoming transactions must
approve tips because this adds new information to the system. However, due to the
network delays, it is not practical to impose that this must happen — how can one
be sure that what one believes to be a tip has not already been approved by someone
else maybe 0.1 seconds ago?
In any case, if everybody collaborates with everybody — only approving recent
and “good” (non-contradicting) transactions, then we are in a good shape. On the
other hand, for someone who only cares about themself, a natural strategy would
just be to choose a couple of old transactions and approve them all the time without
having to do the more cumbersome work of checking new transactions for consistency
thereby adding new information to the system. If everybody behaves in this way, then
no new transactions will be approved, and the network will effectively come to a halt.
Thus, if we want it to work, we need to incentivize the participants to collaborate and
approve each others recent transactions. Therefore, in some sense, it is all about the
incentives. Everybody wants to be helped by others, but, not everybody cares about
helping others themselves. To resolve this without having to introduce monetary
rewards, we could instead think of a reward as simply not being punished by others.
So, we need to slightly amend the above main principle— it now reads: “Help others,
and the others will help you; however, if you choose not to help others, others will
not help you either”. When a new transaction references two previous transactions,
it is a statement of “I vouch for these transactions which have not been vouched for
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before, as well as all their predecessors, and their success is tied to my success”. It
was suggested in [20] that the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) tip selection
algorithm (more precisely, the family of tip selection algorithms) would have these
properties.
This paper mainly deals with the following question: what if some participants
of the network are trying to minimize their costs by adopting a behavior different
from the “default” one? How will the system behave in such circumstances? In other
words, are there enough incentives for the participants to “behave well”? To address
these kinds of questions, we first provide general arguments to prove existence of
“almost symmetric” Nash equilibria for the system, see Section 3. Although one
can hardly access the explicit form of these equilibria in a purely analytical way,
simulations presented in Section 4 show that the “selfish” players will typically still
choose attachment strategies that are similar to the default one, meaning that they
would prefer cooperating with the network rather than simply using it).
Let us stress also that, in this paper, we consider only “selfish” players, i.e., those
who only care about their own costs but still want to use the network in a legitimate
way4. We do not consider the case when there are “malicious” ones, i.e., those who
want to disrupt the network even at a cost to themselves. We are going to treat
several types of attacks against the network in the subsequent papers.
This paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we first introduce
some notations and define the objects we are working with; then, in Section 2.1 we
describe the “recommended” algorithm of how the nodes choose where to attach a
new transaction, and then discuss some basic properties of it, also formulating an
open problem about the asymptotic behavior of the total number of tips. Section 3
contains the main “theoretical” advances of this paper. There, we first discuss what
is a “strategy” that could be used by a selfish player, and then (Section 3.1) make
some further assumptions necessary to formulate our main results (which are placed
in Section 3.2). Then, we prove these results in Section 3.3. Section 4 discusses
some simulation results, mainly in the case where the selfish players try to use a
very natural “greedy” attachment strategy (Section 4.1). In Section 5 one will find
conclusions and some final remarks.
2 Description of the model
In the following we introduce the mathematical model describing the Tangle [20].
4i.e., want to issue valid transactions and have them confirmed by the rest of the network
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℘Figure 1: On the DAGs we are considering: the genesis vertex is on the left, and the
tips are grey
Let card(A) stand for the cardinality of (multi)set A. Consider an oriented multi-
graph T = (V,E), where V is the set of vertices5 and E is the multiset of edges. For
u, v ∈ V , we say that u approves v, if (u, v) ∈ E. For a vertex v ∈ V , let us denote
by
degin(v) = card{e = (u1, u2) ∈ E : u2 = v},
degout(v) = card{e = (u1, u2) ∈ E : u1 = v}
the “incoming” and “outgoing” degrees of the vertex v (counting the multiple edges).
In the following, we refer to multigraphs simply as graphs. We use the notation A(u)
for the set of the vertices approved by u. We say that u ∈ V references v ∈ V if
there is a sequence of sites u = x0, x1, . . . , xk = v such that xj ∈ A(xj−1) for all
j = 1, . . . , k, i.e., there is a directed path from u to v. If degin(w) = 0 (i.e., there are
no edges pointing to w), then we say that w ∈ V is a tip.
Let G be the set of all directed acyclic graphs (also known as DAGs, that is, ori-
ented graphs without cycles) G = (V,E) with the following properties (see Figure 1).
• The graph G is finite and the multiplicity of any edge is at most two (i.e., there
are at most two edges linking the same vertices).
• There is a distinguished vertex ℘ ∈ V such that degout(v) = 2 for all v ∈ V \{℘},
and degout(℘) = 0. This vertex ℘ is called the genesis.
• Any v ∈ V such that v 6= ℘ references ℘; that is, there is an oriented path6
from v to ℘.
5one can think of vertices as transactions
6not necessarily unique
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We now describe the tangle as a continuous-time Markov process on the space G.
The state of the tangle at time t ≥ 0 is a DAG T (t) = (VT (t), ET (t)), where VT (t) is
the set of vertices and ET (t) is the multiset of directed edges at time t. The process’s
dynamics are described in the following way:
• The initial state of the process is defined by VT (0) = ℘, ET (0) = ∅.
• The tangle grows with time, that is, VT (t1) ⊂ VT (t2) and ET (t1) ⊂ ET (t2)
whenever 0 ≤ t1 < t2.
• For a fixed parameter λ > 0, there is a Poisson process of incoming transactions ;
these transactions then become the vertices of the tangle.
• Each incoming transaction chooses7 two vertices v′ and v′′ (which, in general,
may coincide), and we add the edges (v, v′) and (v, v′′). We say in this case
that this new transaction was attached to v′ and v′′ (equivalently, v approves v′
and v′′).
• Specifically, if a new transaction v arrived at time t′, then VT (t′+) = VT (t′)∪{v},
and ET (t′+) = ET (t) ∪ {(v, v′), (v, v′′)}.
Let us write
P(t)(x) = {y ∈ T (t) : y is referenced by x},
F (t)(x) = {z ∈ T (t) : z references x}
for the “past” and the “future” with respect to x (at time t). Note that these introduce
a partial order structure on the tangle. Observe that, if t0 is the time moment when x
was attached to the tangle, then P(t)(x) = P(t0)(x) for all t ≥ t0. We also define the
cumulative weight H(t)x of the vertex x at time t by
H(t)x = 1 + card
(F (t)(x)); (1)
that is, the cumulative weight of x is one8 plus the number of vertices that reference
it. Observe that, for any t > 0, if y approves x thenH(t)x −H(t)y ≥ 1, and the inequality
is strict if and only if there are vertices different from y which also approve x. Also
note that the cumulative weight of any tip is equal to 1.
7the precise selection mechanism will be described below
8its “own weight”
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There is some data associated to each vertex (transaction), created at the moment
when that transaction was attached to the tangle. The precise nature of that data is
not relevant for the purposes of this paper, so we assume that it is an element of some
(unspecified, but finite) set D; what is important, however, is that there is a natural
way to say if the set of vertices is consistent with respect to the data they contain9.
When it is necessary to emphasize that the vertices of G ∈ G contain some data, we
consider the marked DAG G[d] to be (G, d) = (V,E, d), where d is a function V → D.
We define G [d] to be the set of all marked DAGs (G, d), where G ∈ G.
A note on terminology: we reserve the term “node” for entities that participate
in the system by issuing transactions (which are, by their turn, vertices of the tangle
graph). That is, the “players” mentioned in Section 1 are nodes.
2.1 On attaching a new transaction to the Tangle
There is one very important detail that has not been explained, namely: how does
a newly arrived transaction choose which two vertices in the tangle it will approve,
i.e., what is the attachment strategy? Notice that, in principle, it would be good10 for
the whole system if the new transactions always prefer to select tips as attachment
places, since this way more transactions would be “confirmed”11. In any case, it is
quite clear that the appropriate choice of the attachment strategy is essential for the
correct functioning of the system, whatever this could mean.
It is also important to comment that the attachment strategy of a network node
is something “internal” to it; what others can see, are the attachment choices of the
node, but the mechanism behind them need not be publicly known. For this reason,
an attachment strategy cannot be imposed in the protocol.
We now describe a possible choice of the attachment strategy, used to determine
where the incoming transaction will be attached. It is also known as the recommended
tip selection algorithm [20], since, due to reasons described above, the recommended
nodes’ behavior is always to try to approve tips. We stress again, however, that
approving only tips is not imposed in the protocol, since there is usually no way
to know if a node “knew” if the transaction it approved was already approved by
someone else before (also, there is no way to know which approving transaction was
the first).
9one may think that the data refers to value transactions between accounts, and consistency
means that no account has negative balance as a result, and/or the total balance has not increased
10good in the sense described in Section 1
11we discuss the exact meaning of this later; for now, think that “confirmed” means “referenced
by many other transactions”
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Let us denote by L(t) the set of all vertices that are tips at time t, and let L(t) =
card(L(t)). To model the network propagation delays, we introduce a parameter h >
0, and assume that at time t only T (t − h) is known to the entity that issued the
incoming transaction. We then define the tip-selecting random walk, in the following
way. It depends on a parameter q (the backtracking probability) and on a function f .
The initial state of the random walk is the genesis ℘12, and it is stopped upon hitting
the set L(t − h). It is important to observe that v ∈ L(t − h) does not necessarily
mean that v is still a tip at time t. Let f : R+ → R+ be a monotone non-increasing
function. The transition probabilities of the walkers are defined in the following
way: the walk backtracks (i.e., jumps to a randomly chosen site it approves) with
probability q ∈ [0, 1/2); if y approves x 6= ℘, then the transition probability P (f)xy is
proportional to f(Hx −Hy), that is,
P (f)xy =

q
card(A(x)) , if y ∈ A(x),
(1− q)f(H(t−h)x −H(t−h)y )∑
z:x∈A(z) f(H(t−h)x −H(t−h)z )
, if x ∈ A(y),
0, otherwise;
(2)
for x = ℘ we define the transition probabilities as above, but with q = 0. In words, the
walker backtracks (i.e., moves one step away from the tips) with (total) probability q,
and advances one step towards the tips with (total) probability (1 − q) and relative
weights as above. Note that the fact that q < 1/2 guarantees that the random walk
eventually reaches a tip13 almost surely. In what follows, we will mostly assume
that f(s) = exp(−αs) for some α ≥ 0. We use the notation P (α) for the transition
probabilities in this case. Intuitively, the smaller is the value of α, the more random
the walk is14. It is worth observing that the case q = 0 and α → ∞ corresponds
to the GHOST protocol of [23] (more precisely, to the obvious generalization of the
GHOST protocol to the case when a tree is substituted by a DAG).
Now, to select two tips w1 and w2 where our transaction will be attached, just
run two independent random walks as above, and stop when on the first hit L(t−h).
One can also require that w1 should be different from w2; for that, one may re-run
the second random walk in the case its exit point happened to be the same as that
of the first random walk. Observe that (T (t), t ≥ 0) is a continuous-time transient
12although in practical implementations one may start it in some place closer to the tips
13more precisely, reaches a vertex that the node assumes to be a tip
14physicists would call the case of small α high temperature regime, and the case of large α low
temperature regime (that is, α stands for the inverse temperature)
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Markov process on G; since the state space is quite large, it is difficult to analyse this
process. In particular, for a fixed time t, it is not easy to study the above random
walk since it takes place on a random graph, e.g., can be viewed as a random walk
in a random environment; it is common knowledge that random walks in random
environments are notoriously hard to deal with.
Some motivation for choosing the attachment strategy in the above way is pro-
vided in [20]. Very briefly, it encourages the nodes to choose recent transactions for
approval (since a transaction which approved a couple of old transactions, also known
as lazy tip, is unlikely to be chosen by the above random walk, due to the large dif-
ference in cumulative weights in the argument of f in (2)) and also gives protection
against certain kinds of attacks (e.g., the double-spending attack).
Let γ0 ∈ (0, 1) be some number, typically close to 1. We say that a transaction is
confirmed with confidence γ0 if, with probability at least γ0, the large-α random walk
15
ends in a tip which references that transaction. It may happen that a transaction
does not get confirmed (even, possible, does not get approved a single time), and
becomes orphaned forever. Let us define the event
U = {every transaction eventually gets approved}.
We believe that the following statement holds true; however, we have only a
heuristical argument in its favor, not a rigorous proof. In any case, it is mostly of
theoretical interest, since, as explained below, in practice we will find ourselves in the
situation where P[U ] = 0. We therefore state it as
Conjecture 2.1. It holds that
P[U ] =

0, if
∫ +∞
0
f(s) ds <∞,
1, if
∫ +∞
0
f(s) ds =∞.
(3)
Explanation. First of all, it should be true that P[U ] ∈ {0, 1} since U is a tail event
with respect to the natural filtration; however, it does not seem to be very easy to
prove the 0–1 law in this context – recall that we are dealing with a transient Markov
process on an infinite state space. Next, consider a tip v0 which got attached to the
tangle at time t0, and assume that it is still a tip at time t  t0; also, assume that,
among all tips, v0 is “closest”, in some suitable sense, to the genesis. Let us now
15recall that the large-α random walk is “more deterministic”
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℘v0
u0
w0
Figure 2: The walk on the tangle and tip selection. Tips are circles, and transactions
which were approved at least once are disks.
think of the following question: what is the probability that v0 will still be a tip at
time t+ 1?
Look at Figure 2: during the time interval [t, t+1), O(1) new particles will arrive,
and the corresponding walks will travel from the genesis ℘ looking for tips. Each of
these walks will have to cross the dotted vertical segment on the picture, and with
positive probability at least one of them will pass through w0, one of the vertices
approved by v0. Assume that w0 was already confirmed, i.e., it is connected to the
right end of the tangle via some other transaction u0 that approves w0. Then, it is
clear (but not easy to prove!) that the cumulative weight of both u0 and w0 should
be O(t), and so, when in w0, the walk will jump to the tip v0 with probability f(O(t)).
This suggests that the probability that v0 ∈ L(t + 1) (i.e., that v0 still is tip
at time t + 1) is f(O(t)), and the Borel-Cantelli lemma16 gives that the probability
that v0 will be eventually approved is less than 1 or equal to 1 depending on whether∑
n f(n) converges or diverges; the convergence (divergence) of the sum is equivalent
to convergence (divergence) of the integral in (3) due to the monotonicity of the func-
tion f . A standard probabilistic argument17 would then imply that if the probability
that a given tip remains orphaned forever is uniformly positive, then the probability
that at least one tip remains orphaned forever is equal to 1.
One may naturally think that it would be better to choose the function f in such
a way that, almost surely, every tip eventually gets confirmed. However, as explained
in Section 4.1 of [20], there is a good reason to choose a rapidly decreasing function f ,
because this defends the system against nodes’ misbehavior and attacks. The idea is
then to assume that a transaction which did not get confirmed during a sufficiently
16to be precise, a bit more refined argument is needed since the corresponding events are not
independent
17which is also not so easy to formalize in these circumstances
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long period of time is “unlucky”, and needs to be reattached18 to the tangle. Let
us fix some K > 0: it stands for the time when an unlucky transaction is reissued
(because there is already very little hope that it would be confirmed “naturally”).
We call a transaction issued less than K time units ago “unconfirmed”, and if a
transaction was issued more than K time units ago and was not confirmed, we call
it “orphaned”. In the following, we assume that the system is stable, in the sense
that the “recent” unconfirmed transactions do not accumulate and the time until a
transaction is confirmed does not depend a lot on the moment when it appeared in
the system19. We prefer not to elaborate on the exact mathematical definition of
stability here, since it requires considering a certain compactification of the space
of DAGs (which essentially amounts to considering DAGs with “genesis at minus
infinity”), but, hopefully, the idea is intuitively clear anyway.
In that stable regime, let p be the probability that a transaction is confirmed K
time units after it was issued for the first time; the number of times a transaction
should be issued to achieve confirmation is then a Geometric random variable with
parameter p (and, therefore, with expected value p−1); so, the mean time until the
transaction is confirmed is K/p. Let us then recall the following remarkable fact be-
longing to the queuing theory, known as the Little’s formula (sometimes also referred
to as the Little’s theorem or the Little’s identity):
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that λa is the arrival rate, µ is the mean number of
customers in the system, and T is the mean time a customer spends in the system.
Then T = µ/λa.
Proof. See e.g. Section 5.2 of [6]. To understand intuitively why this fact holds true,
one may reason in the following way: assume that, while in the system, each customer
pays money to the system with rate 1. Then, at large time t, the total amount of
money earned by the system would be (approximately) µt on one hand, and Tλat on
the other hand. Dividing by t and then sending t to infinity, we obtain µ = Tλa.
Little’s formula then implies20 the following (recall that λ is the rate of the in-
coming transactions flow, not counting reattachments)
18in fact, the nodes of the network may adopt a rule that instructs to delete the transactions that
are older than K and still are tips from their databases
19simulations indicate that this is indeed the case when α is small (cf. a recent paper [16]); however,
it is not guaranteed to happen for large values of α
20in the language of queuing systems, a reissued transaction is a customer which goes back to the
server after an unsuccessful service attempt
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Proposition 2.3. The average number of unconfirmed transactions21 in the system
is equal to p−1λK.
Proof. Indeed, apply Proposition 2.2 with λa = λ (think of a transaction which was
reattached as a customer which returns to the server after an insuccessful service
attempt; this way, the incoming flow of customers still has rate λ). As observed
before, the mean time spent by a customer in the system is equal to K/p.
When the tangle contains data, this, in principle, can make transactions incom-
patible between each other. In this case one may choose more sophisticated methods
of tip selection. As we already mentioned22, selecting tips with larger values of α pro-
vides better defense against attacks and misbehavior; however, smaller values of α
make the system more stable with respect to the transactions’ confirmation times.
An example of “mixed-α” strategy is the following. Define the “model tip” w0 as a
result of the random walk with large α, then select two tips w1 and w2 with random
walks with small α, but check that
P(t−h)(w0) ∪ P(t−h)(w1) ∪ P(t−h)(w2)
is consistent.
3 Selfish nodes and Nash equilibria
Now, we are going to study the situation when some participants of the network are
“selfish” and want to use a customized attachment strategy, in order to improve the
confirmation time of their transactions (possibly at the expense of the others).
For a finite set A let us denote byM(A) the set of all probability measures on A,
that is
M(A) =
{
µ : A→ R such that µ(a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A and
∑
a∈A
µ(a) = 1
}
.
Let
M =
⋃
G=(V,E)∈G
M(V × V )
21we regard all reattachments as a single trasaction, and if one of the reattachments is confirmed,
the transaction is considered confirmed
22recall the discussion around f(s) = exp(−αs) right after (2)
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be the union of the sets of all probability measures on the pairs of (not necessarily dis-
tinct) vertices of DAGs belonging to G. Then, a general mixed attachment strategy S
is a map
S : G [d] →M (4)
with the property S(V,E, d) ∈ M(V × V ) for any G[d] = (V,E, d) ∈ G [d]; that is,
for any G ∈ G with data attached to the vertices (which corresponds to the state of
the tangle at a given time) there is a corresponding probability measure on the set
of pairs of the vertices. Note also that in the above we considered ordered pairs of
vertices, which, of course, does not restrict the generality.
Let κ > 0 be a fixed number. We now assume that, for a large N , there are κN
nodes that follow the default tip selection algorithm, and N “selfish” nodes that try
to minimize their “cost”, whatever it could mean23. Assume that all nodes issue
transactions with the same rate λ
(κ+1)N
, independently. The overall rate of “honest”
transactions in the system is then equal to λκ
κ+1
, and the overall rate of transactions
issued by selfish nodes equals λ
κ+1
. We also justify the assumption that the number
of selfish nodes is large by observing that
• a small number of nodes that do not want to disrupt the system but just want
to obtain some advantages for themselves (like e.g. faster confirmations times)
are unlikely to “globally” influence the system in any considerable way, even if
they do obtain those advantages for themselves;
• however, when it becomes known that it is possible to obtain advantages by
deviating from the “recommended” behavior, it is reasonable to expect that a
large number of independent entities would try to do it.
3.1 Some further assumptions and definitions
Let us now recall that, in practice, the nodes are computers running a specialized
software, so they are selecting the places to attach their transactions in some al-
gorithmic way, using limited physical resourses. In such situation, it is unrealistic
to assume that a general strategy as in (4) could be implemented “directly”, since
the space G [d] is infinite; for the same reason, even working with simple attachment
23for example, the cost may be the expected confirmation time of a transaction (conditioned that
it is eventually confirmed), the probability that it was not approved during certain (fixed) time
interval, etc.; below in (6) we provide the exact definition of the cost function we are working with
in this paper
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strategies (which are maps that take an element of G [d] as an input and produce a
deterministic pair of its vertices as an output) is unrealistic.
Therefore, it looks like a good idea to restrict the strategy space we are working
with. First, we consider the following simplifying assumption (which is, by the way,
also quite reasonable, since, in practice, one would hardly use the genesis as the
starting vertex for the random walks due to runtime issues):
Assumption L. There is n1 > 0 such that the attachment strategies of all nodes (in-
cluding those that use the default attachment strategy) only depend on the restriction
of the tangle to the last n1 transactions that they see.
Observe that, under the above assumption, the set of all such strategies can be
thought of as a compact convex subset of Rd, where d = d(n1) is sufficiently large.
In this section we use a different approach to model the network propagation
delays: instead of assuming that an incoming transaction does not have information
about the state of the tangle during last h units of time, we rather assume that it does
not have information about the last n0 transactions attached to the tangle, where n0 <
n1 is some fixed positive number (so, effectively, the strategies would depend on
subgraphs induced by n1−n0 transactions, although the results of this section do not
rely on this assumption). Clearly, these two approaches are quite similar in spirit;
however, the second one permits us to avoid certain technical difficulties related to
randomness of the number of unseen transactions in the first case. Also, it will be
more natural and convenient to pass from continuous to discrete time.
Now, even with the restrictions as above, it is still unrealistic to work with the
simple strategies of the sort “choose a fixed pair of transactions for each possible
restriction of the tangle to the set of last n1 transactions”, because implementing it in
practive would require effectively dealing with sets indexed by all possible restrictions,
and the size of the latter set clearly grows exponentially in n1. Instead, as hinted
in the beginning of this subsection, we think of different “attachment methods” as
simple strategies. Formally, let G [d]n1 be the set of all possible sub-DAGs of G [d] with n1
vertices, and Mn1 be the set of all probability measures on the vertices’ pairs of
elements of G [d]n1 . Clearly, the set G [d]n1 is finite. An attachment method is then a map
J : G [d]n1 →Mn1 ;
it is thought of as a (randomized) polynomial-time polynomial-memory algorithm
which takes the last n1 transactions and returns a pair of those transactions which
would serve as attachment’s locations. Then, the available simple strategies are
attachment methods
{Jβ, β ∈ A},
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where A is some (unspecified) index set. It is also important to observe that this
approach does not restricts generality. We then denote by Q the set of all mixed
strategies of the form JΞ, where Ξ is a random variable on A. Observe also that the
set of simple strategies can be thought of as a subset of Rd (which we assume also to
be compact), where d = d(n1) is sufficiently large, and Q would be then its convex
hull.
Let S1, . . . ,SN ∈ Q be the attachment strategies used by the selfish nodes. To
evaluate the “goodness” of a strategy, one has to choose and then optimize some suit-
able observable (that stands for the “cost”); as usual, there are several “reasonable”
ways to do this. We decided to choose the following one, for definiteness and also
for technical reasons (to guarantee the continuity of a certain function used below);
one can probably extend our arguments to other reasonable cost functions. Assume
that a transaction v was attached to the tangle at time tv, so v ∈ VT (t) for all t ≥ tv.
Fix some (typically large) M0 ∈ N. Let t(v)1 , . . . , t(v)M0 be the moments when the sub-
sequent M0 (after v) transactions were attached to the tangle. For k = 1 . . . ,M0
let R
(v)
k be the event that the default tip-selecting walk
24 on T
(
t
(v)
k
)
stops in a tip
that does not reference v. We then define the random variable
W (v) = 1
R
(v)
1
+ · · ·+ 1
R
(v)
M0
(5)
to be the number of times that the M0 “subsequent” tip selection random walks do not
reference v (in the above, 1A is the indicator function of an event A). Intuitively, the
smaller is the value of W (v)/M0, the bigger is the chance that v is quickly confirmed.
Next, assume that (v
(k)
j , j ≥ 1) are the transactions issued by the kth (selfish)
node. We define
C(k)(S1, . . . ,SN) = M−10 lim
n→∞
W (v
(k)
1 ) + · · ·+W (v(k)n )
n
, (6)
to be the mean cost of the kth node given that S1, . . . ,SN are the attachment strate-
gies of the selfish nodes.
Definition 3.1. We say that a set of strategies (S1, . . . ,SN) ∈ QN is a Nash equi-
librium if
C(k)(S1, . . . ,Sk−1,Sk,Sk+1, . . . ,SN) ≤ C(k)(S1, . . . ,Sk−1,S ′,Sk+1, . . . ,SN)
for any k and any S ′ ∈ Q.
Observe that, since the nodes are indistinguishable, the fact that (S1, . . . ,SN) is
a Nash equilibrium implies that so is (Sσ1 , . . . ,Sσ(N)) for any permutation σ.
24i.e., the one used by nodes following the default attachment strategy
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3.2 Main results
From now on, we assume that vertices contain no data, i.e., the set D is empty; this
is not absolutely necessary because, with the data, the proof will be essentially the
same; however, the notations would become much more cumbersome. Also, there
will be no reattachments; again, this would unnecessarily complicate the proofs (one
would have to work with decorated Poisson processes). In fact, we are dealing with a
so-called random-turn game here, see e.g. Chapter 9 of [15] for other examples.
Consider, for the moment, the situation when all nodes use the same attachment
strategy (i.e., there are no selfish nodes). The restriction of the tangle on the last n1
transactions then becomes a Markov chain on the state space Gn1 . We now make the
following technical assumption on that Markov chain:
Assumption D. The above Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic.
It is important to observe that Assumption D is not guaranteed to hold for every
natural attachment strategy; however, still, this is not a very restrictive assumption
in practice because every finite Markov chain may be turned into an irreducible and
aperiodic one by an arbitrarily small perturbation of the transition matrix.
Then, we are able to prove the following
Theorem 3.2. Under Assumptions L and D, the system has at least one Nash equi-
librium.
Symmetric games do not always have symmetric Nash equilibria, as shown in [9].
Also, even when such equilibria exist in the class of mixed strategies, they may be
“inferior” to asymmetric pure equilibria; for example, this happens in the classical
“Battle of the sexes” game (see e.g. Section 7.2 of [15]).
Now, the goal is to prove that, if the number of selfish nodes N is large, then for
any equilibrium state the costs of distinct nodes cannot be significantly different. Let
us recall the notations we use: S1, . . . ,SN are the strategies of the N selfish nodes,
and C(k)(S1, . . . ,SN), k = 1, . . . , N , are the mean costs of the selfish nodes, defined
in (6). Now, we have the following
Theorem 3.3. For any ε > 0 there exists N0 (depending on the default attachment
strategy) such that, for all N ≥ N0 and any Nash equilibrium (S1, . . . ,SN) it holds
that ∣∣C(k)(S1, . . . ,SN)− C(j)(S1, . . . ,SN)∣∣ < ε (7)
for all k, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Now, let us define the notion of approximate Nash equilibrium:
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Definition 3.4. For a fixed ε > 0, we say that a set of strategies (S1, . . . ,SN) ∈ QN
is an ε-equilibrium if
C(k)(S1, . . . ,Sk−1,Sk,Sk+1, . . . ,SN) ≤ C(k)(S1, . . . ,Sk−1,S ′,Sk+1, . . . ,SN) + ε
for any k and any S ′ ∈ Q.
The motivation for introducing this notion is that, if ε is very small, then, in
practice, ε-equilibria are essentially indistinguishable from the “true” Nash equilibria.
Theorem 3.5. For any ε > 0 there exists N0 (depending on the default attachment
strategy) such that, for all N ≥ N0 and any Nash equilibrium (S1, . . . ,SN) it holds
that (S, . . . ,S) is an ε-equilibrium, where
S = 1
N
N∑
k=1
S(k) (8)
(that is, all selfish nodes use the same “averaged” strategy defined above). The costs
of all selfish nodes are then equal to
1
N
N∑
k=1
C(k)(S1, . . . ,SN),
that is, the average cost in the Nash equilibrium.
In other words, for large N one can essentially assume that all selfish nodes follow
the same attachment strategy. This result will be important in Section 4, because it
makes it possible to use (practical) simulations in order to find the Nash equilibria
of systems with large number of selfish players.
3.3 Proofs
First, we need the following technical result:
Lemma 3.6. Let P be the transition matrix of an irreducible and aperiodic discrete-
time Markov chain on a finite state space E. Let P̂ be a continuous map from a
compact set F ⊂ Rd to the set of all stochastic matrices on E (equipped by the
distance inherited from the usual matrix norm on the space of all matrices on E).
Fix θ ∈ (0, 1), denote P˜ (s) = θP + (1− θ)P̂ (s), and let pis be the (unique) stationary
measure of P˜ (s). Then pis is also continuous (as a function of s).
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Proof. In the following we give a (rather) probabilistic proof of this fact via the Kac’s
lemma, although, of course, a purely analytic proof is also possible. Irreducibility and
aperiodicity of P imply that, for some m0 ∈ N and ε0 > 0
Pm0xy ≥ ε0 (9)
for all x, y ∈ E, where Pm0 = (Pm0xy , x, y ∈ E) is the transition matrix in m0 steps.
Now, (9) implies that
P˜m0xy (s) ≥ θm0ε0 (10)
for all x, y ∈ E and all s ∈ F .
Being (Xn, n ≥ 0) a stochastic process on E, let us define
τ(x) = min{k ≥ 1 : Xk = x}
(with the convention min ∅ = ∞) to be the hitting time of the site x ∈ E by the
stochastic process X. Now, let P(s)x and E(s)x be the probability and the expectation
with respect to the Markov chain with transition matrix P˜ (s) starting from x ∈ E.
We now recall the Kac’s lemma (cf. e.g. Theorem 1.22 of [8]): for all x ∈ E it holds
that
pis(x) =
1
E(s)x τ(x)
. (11)
Now, (10) readily implies that, for all x ∈ E and n ∈ N,
P(s)x [τ(x) ≥ n] ≤ c1e−c2n (12)
for some positive constants c1,2 which do not depend on s. This in its turn implies
that the series
E(s)x τ(x) =
∞∑
n=1
P(s)x [τ(x) ≥ n]
converges uniformly in s and so E(s)x τ(x) is uniformly bounded from above25; also,
the Uniform Limit Theorem (see e.g. Section D.6.2 of [19]) implies that E(s)x τ(x) is
continuous in s. Therefore, for any x ∈ E, (11) implies that pis(x) is also a continuous
function of s.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The authors were unable to find a result available in the lit-
erature that implies Theorem 3.2 directly; nevertheless, its proof is quite standard
25and, of course, it is also bounded from below by 1
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and essentially follows Nash’s original paper [18] (see also [10]). There is only one
technical difficulty, which we intend to address via the above preparatory steps: one
needs to prove the continuity of the cost function.
Denote by piS the invariant measure of the Markov chain given that the (selfish)
nodes use the “strategy vector” s = (S1, . . . ,SN). Then, the idea is to use Lemma 3.6
with θ = κ
κ+1
, P the transition matrix obtained from the default attachment strategy,
and P̂ (s) is the transition matrix obtained from the strategy S ′ = N−1∑Nk=1 Sk (ob-
serve that N nodes using the strategies S1, . . . ,SN , is the same as one node with strat-
egy S ′ issuing transactions N times faster). Assumption D together with Lemma 3.6
then imply that pis := piS′ is a continuous function of s.
Let ES,SˆpiS′ be the expectation with respect to the following procedure: take the
“starting” graph according to piS′ , then attach to it a transaction according to the
strategy S, and then keep attaching subsequent transactions according to the strat-
egy Sˆ (instead of S ′ and Sˆ we may also use the strategy vectors; S ′ and Sˆ would
be then their averages). Let also W (k) be the random variable defined as in (5) for
an arbitrary transaction v issued by the kth node. Then, the Ergodic Theorem for
Markov chains (see e.g. Theorem 1.23 of [8]) implies that
C(k)(S) = ESk,S′piS′ W (k). (13)
It is not difficult to see that the above expression is a polynomial of the S’s coefficients
(i.e., the corresponding probabilities) and piS′-values, and hence it is a continuous
function on the space of strategies Mn1 . Using this, the rest of the proof is standard,
it is obtained as a consequence of the Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [14], also with
the help of the Berge’s Maximum Theorem (see e.g. Chapter E.3 of [19]).
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Without restricting generality we may assume that
C(1)(S1, . . . ,SN) = max
k=1,...,N
C(k)(S1, . . . ,SN),
C(2)(S1, . . . ,SN) = min
k=1,...,N
C(k)(S1, . . . ,SN),
so we then need to proof that C(1)(s)−C(2)(s) < ε, where s = (S1, . . . ,SN). Now, the
main idea of the proof is the following: if C(1)(s) is considerably larger than C(2)(s),
then the owner of the first node may decide to adopt the strategy used by the second
one. This would not necessarily decrease his costs to the former costs of the second
node since a change in an individual strategy leads to changes in all costs; however,
when N is large, the effects of changing the strategy of only one node would be
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SN
Figure 3: On the main idea of the proof of Theorem 3.3. The node with the highest
cost will switch to the strategy of the node with the lowest cost. That will not
guarantee exactly that same cost to the former node, but the difference will be rather
small since N is large (so the change in one component of the strategy vector will not
influence a lot the outcome).
small, and (if the difference of C(1)(s) and C(2)(s) were not small) this would lead to
a contradiction to the assumption that s was a Nash equilibrium.
So, let us denote s′ = (S2,S2,S3, . . . ,SN), the strategy vector after the first node
adopted the strategy of its “more successful” colleague, see Figure 3. Let
S = 1
N
(S1 + · · ·+ SN) and S ′ = 1
N
(
2S2 + S3 + · · ·+ SN
)
be the two “averaged” strategies. In the following, we are going to compare C(2)(s) =
E(S2,S)piS W (2) (the “old” cost of the second node) with C(1)(s′) = E
(S2,S′)
piS′ W
(1) (the
“new” cost of the first node, after it adopted the second node’s strategy). We need
the following
Lemma 3.7. For any measure pi on Gn1 and any strategy vectors s = (S1, . . . ,SN)
and s′ = (S ′1, . . . ,S ′N) such that Sk = S ′k for all k = 2, . . . , N , we have∣∣E(Sj ,S)pi W (j) − E(S′j ,S′)pi W (j)∣∣ ≤ M0N (14)
for all j = 2, . . . , N .
Proof. Let us define the event
A = {among the M0 transactions there is at least one issued by the first node},
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and observe that, by the union bound, the probability that it occurs is at most M0/N .
Then, using the fact that E(Sj ,S)pi (W (j)1Ac) = E
(Sj ,S′)
pi (W (j)1Ac) (since, on A
c, the first
node does not “contribute” to W (j)), write∣∣E(Sj ,S)pi W (j) − E(S′j ,S′)pi W (j)∣∣
=
∣∣E(Sj ,S)pi (W (j)1A) + E(Sj ,S)pi (W (j)1Ac)− E(Sj ,S′)pi (W (j)1A)− E(Sj ,S′)pi (W (j)1Ac)∣∣
=
∣∣E(Sj ,S)pi (W (j)1A)− E(Sj ,S′)pi (W (j)1A)∣∣
≤ M0
N
,
where we also used that W (j) ≤ 1. This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.7.
We continue proving Theorem 3.3. First, by symmetry, we have
E(S2,S′)piS′ W
(1) = E(S2,S′)piS′ W
(2). (15)
Also, it holds that ∣∣E(S2,S′)piS′ W (2) − E(S2,S)piS′ W (2)∣∣ ≤ M0N (16)
by Lemma 3.7. Then, similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can obtain that the
function
(S,S ′,S ′′) 7→ E(S,S′)piS′′ W (2)
is continuous; since it is defined on a compact, it is also uniformly continuous. That
is, for any ε′ > 0 there exist δ′ > 0 such that if ‖(S,S ′,S ′′)− (S˜, S˜ ′, S˜ ′′)‖ < δ′, then∣∣E(S,S′)piS′′ W (2) − E(S˜,S˜′)piS˜′′ W (2)∣∣ < ε′.
Choose N0 = d1/δ′e. We then obtain from the above that∣∣E(S2,S)piS′ W (2) − E(S2,S)piS W (2)∣∣ < ε′. (17)
The relations (15), (16), and (17) imply that∣∣E(S2,S′)piS′ W (1) − E(S2,S)piS W (2)∣∣ ≤ ε′ + M0N .
On the other hand, since we assumed that s is a Nash equilibrium, it holds that
E(S2,S′)piS′ W
(1) = C(1)(s′) ≥ C(1)(s) = E(S1,S)piS W (1), (18)
which implies that
E(S1,S)piS W
(1) − E(S2,S)piS W (2) ≤ ε′ +
M0
N
.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
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Proof of Theorem 3.5. To begin, we observe that the proof of the second part is
immediate, since, as already noted before, for an external observer, the situation
where there are N nodes with strategies (S1, . . . ,SN) is indistinguishable from the
situation with one node with averaged strategy.
Now, we need to prove that, for any fixed ε′ > 0 it holds that
C(1)(S, . . . ,S) ≤ C(1)(S˜,S, . . . ,S) + ε′ (19)
for all large enough N (the claim would then follow by symmetry). Recall that we
have
C(1)(S, . . . ,S) = E(S,S)piS W (1), (20)
C(1)(S1, . . . ,SN) = E(S1,S)piS W (1), (21)
and
C(1)(S˜,S, . . . ,S) = E(S˜,S′)piS′ W (1), (22)
where
S ′ = 1
N
(S˜ + (N − 1)S) = 1
N
(
S˜ + N − 1
N
(S1 + · · ·+ SN)
)
.
Now, the second part of this theorem together with Theorem 3.3 imply26 that, for
any fixed ε > 0 ∣∣E(S,S)piS W (1) − E(S1,S)piS W (1)∣∣ < ε (23)
for all large enough N .
Next, let us denote
S ′′ = 1
N
(S˜ + S2 + · · ·+ SN).
Then, again using the uniform continuity argument (as in the proof of Theorem 3.3),
we obtain that, for any ε′′ > 0∣∣E(S˜,S′)piS′ W (1) − E(S˜,S′′)piS′′ W (1)∣∣ < ε′′ (24)
for all large enough N . However,
E(S˜,S′′)piS′′ W
(1) = C(1)(S˜,S2, . . . ,SN) ≥ C(1)(S1,S2, . . . ,SN) = E(S1,S)piS W (1),
since (S1, . . . ,SN) is a Nash equilibrium. Then, (23)–(24) imply that∣∣E(S,S)piS W (1) − E(S˜,S′)piS′ W (1)∣∣ < ε+ ε′′,
and, recalling (20) and (22), we conclude the proof of Theorem 3.5.
26note that Theorem 3.3 implies that, when N is large, the nodes already have “almost” the same
cost in the Nash equilibrium (S1, . . . ,SN )
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T (t) T (t + ∆)
Figure 4: Why the “greedy” tip selection strategy will not work (the two “best” tips
are shown as larger circles).
4 Simulations
In this section we investigate Nash equilibria between selfish nodes via simulations.
As discussed in Section 1, this is motivated by the following important question:
since the choice of an attachment strategy is not enforced, there may indeed be
nodes which would prefer to “optimise” their strategies in order to decrease the mean
confirmation time of their transactions. So, can this lead to a situation where the
corresponding Nash equilibrium is “bad for everybody”, effectively leading to the
system’s malfunctioning?
Due to Theorem 3.5 we may assume that all selfish nodes use the same attachment
strategy. Even then, it is probably unfeasible to calculate that strategy exactly;
instead, we resort to simulations, which indeed will show that the equilibrium strategy
of the selfish nodes will not be much different from the (suitably chosen) default
strategy, at least in the (very natural) situation below. But, before doing that, let
us explain the intuition behind this fact. Naively, a reasonable strategy for a selfish
node would be the following:
(1) Calculate the exit distribution of the tip-selecting random walk.
(2) Find the two tips where this distribution attains its “best”27 values.
(3) Approve these two tips.
However, this strategy fails when other selfish nodes are present. To understand
this, look at Figure 4: many selfish nodes attach their transactions to the two “best”
27i.e., the maximum and the second-to-maximum
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tips. As a result, the “neighborhood” of these two tips becomes “overcrowded”: there
is so much competition between the transactions issued by the selfish nodes, that the
chances of them being approved soon actually decrease28.
To illustrate this fact, several simulations have been done. All the results depicted
here were generated using (2) as the transition probabilities, with q = 1/3, and a
network delay of h = 1 second. Also, a transaction will be reattached if the two
following criteria are met:
(1) the transaction is older than 20 seconds
(2) the transaction is not referenced by the tip selected by a random walk with
α =∞29.
This way, we guarantee not only that the unconfirmed transactions will be eventu-
ally confirmed, but also that all transactions that were never reattached are referenced
by most of the tips. Note that when the reattachment is allowed in the simulations,
if a new transaction references an old, already reattached transaction together with
its newly reissued counterpart, there will be a double spending. Even though the
odds of that are low (since when a transaction is re-emitted, it will be old enough
to be almost never chosen by the random walk algorithm), a specific procedure was
included in the simulations in order to not allow double spendings.
The average costs were simulated as defined at equations (5) and (6), so a certain
value of M0 had to be chosen. Since the value of W (v)/λ is related to the time
of approval of v (whenever the transaction is indeed approved before t
(v)
M0
), we want
M0 to be sufficiently large, in order to capture the effect of most of the approvals.
Figure 5 depicts the typical cumulative distribution of the time of the first approval,
for several values of α and λ. Note that roughly 95% of the transactions will be
approved before t = 5s, and almost its totality will be approved before t = 10s. For
that reason, in both cases (λ = 25 and λ = 50), the mean cost was calculated over
the transactions attached during a time interval of approximately 10s (M0 = 500 for
λ = 50 and M0 = 250 for λ = 25), so almost the totality of approvals will be “seen”
by the average cost.
28the “new” best tips are not among them, as shown on Figure 4 on the right
29here, when the random walk must choose among n transactions with the same weight, it will
choose randomly, with equal probabilities
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution of time of approvals for several values of α and λ
4.1 One dimensional Nash equilibria
In this section, we will study the Nash equilibria (S1, . . . ,SN) of the tangle problem,
considering the following strategy space:{
(1− θ)S0 + θS1, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1}
where the simple strategies S0 and S1 are the default tip selection strategy and the
“greedy” strategy (defined in the beginning of this section) correspondingly; that is,
Si = (1 − θi)S0 + θiS1 where θi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, . . . , N . The goal is to find the Nash
equilibria relative to the costs defined in the last section (equations (6) and (5)). The
selfish nodes will try to optimise their transaction cost with respect to θi.
By Theorem 3.5, each Nash equilibrium in this form will be equivalent to another
Nash equilibrium with “averaged” strategies, i.e.:
S =
(
1− 1
N
N∑
k=1
θi
)
S0 + 1
N
N∑
k=1
θiS1 = (1− θ)S0 + θS1 for each i = 1, . . . , N,
Now, suppose that we have a fixed fraction γ of selfish nodes, that choose a strategy
among the possible S. The non-selfish nodes will not be able to choose their strategy,
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so they will be restricted, as expected, to S0. Note that, since they cannot choose
their strategy, they will not “play” the game. Since the costs are linear over S, such
mixed strategy game will be equivalent30 to a game where only a fraction p = γθ ≤ γ
of the nodes chooses S1 over S0, and the rest of the nodes chooses S0 over S1. Note
that this equivalence does not contradict the theorems proved in the last sections,
that state:
• all the nodes will have the same average costs when the system is at a Nash
equilibrium;
• any Nash equilibrium has an equivalent Nash equilibrium with “averaged”
strategies, where all the nodes will have the same strategies.
From now on, we will refer (unless stated otherwise) to this second pure strategy
game. Figure 6(a) represents a typical graph of average costs of transactions issued
under S0 and S1, as a function of the fraction p, for a low α and two different values
of λ. As already demonstrated, when in equilibrium, the selfish nodes should issue
transactions with the same average costs. That means that the system should reach
equilibrium in one of the following states:
(1) some selfish nodes choose S0 and the rest choose S1 (0 < p < γ), all of them
with the same average costs;
(2) all selfish nodes choose S1 (p = γ);
(3) all selfish nodes choose S0 (p = 0).
If the two curves on the graphs do not intersect, the equilibrium should be clearly
at state (2) or (3), depending on which of the average costs is larger. If the two
curves on the graphs intercept each other, we will also have the intersection point
as a Nash equilibrium candidate. We call s¯ the vector of strategies on equilibrium
and p¯ the fraction of nodes that will issue transactions under S1 when the system
is in s¯. We define p− = p¯ − γ
N
and p+ = p¯ + γ
N
, meaning that p− and p+ will be
deviations from p¯, that result from one node switching strategies, from S0 to S1 and
from S1 to S0, respectively. We also define s¯− and s¯+ as strategy vectors related to p−
and p+. Note on Figure 7 that this kind of Nash equilibrium candidate may not be a
real equilibrium. In the first example (7(a)), when the system is at point p¯ and a node
switches strategies from S0 to S1 (moving from p¯ to p+), the cost actually decreases,
30this way, we deal with just one variable (p) instead of two (γ and θ) and none of the parameters
of the system is lost
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Figure 6: Dotted lines are the raw data. Solid lines were fitted with least squares
polynomials of four-degree. Costs (a) and gain of the strategy S1 over S0; (b) for
α = 0.01.
so p¯ cannot be a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, the second example (7(b))
shows a Nash equilibrium at point p¯, since deviations to p− and p+ will increase costs.
Now, let us re-examine Figure 6(a). Here, the Nash equilibrium will occur at
the point p¯, since we have a situation as on Figure 7(b). That point is easily found
at Figure 6(b), when δ = 0. Note that the Nash equilibrium for a larger λ will
be at a smaller θ0 than the Nash equilibrium for a smaller λ. This was already
expected, since, for a larger λh, the tips will be naturally more “overcrowded”, so
the effect depicted at Figure 4 will be amplified. Thus, the Nash equilibrium for the
higher λh cases must occur with a smaller proportion of transactions issued with the
pure strategy S1.
Let us now again consider the mixed strategy game. In the case when all the
nodes are allowed to choose between the two pure strategies (S0 and S1), the Nash
equilibrium will be indeed at θ0 = p¯ (as expected, since in this case γ = 1). If just
a fraction γ = p/θ > p¯ of the nodes is selfish, then the Nash equilibrium will occur
when θ0 = p¯/γ. Now, if γ ≤ p¯, the costs of the nodes will not coincide31. In that case,
the average cost of transactions under S1 will always be smaller than the average cost
of transactions under S0, meaning that the Nash equilibrium will be met at θ0 = 1.
31that is the case for the range of studied parameters
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Figure 7: Different Nash equilibrium points in systems with similar curves
Summing up, the Nash equilibrium θ0, in these cases, will be met at:
θ0 = min{p¯/γ, 1}.
Figure 8(a) represents a typical graph of average costs of transactions under S0
and transactions under S1 as a function of fraction p, for a higher α. In that case,
even though the average costs of transactions under S0 and transactions under S1 do
not coincide for any reasonable p (meaning that, here, the Nash equilibrium will be
met at θ = 1), the typical difference between the possible pure strategies (that, from
now on, we will call absolute gains) will be low, as depicted on Figure 8(b).
Figure 9 shows the average cost increase imposed on the nodes following the
default strategy by the nodes issuing transactions under S1. Let W (p) be the non-
greedy nodes costs depicted in Figure 8(a). The cost increase is calculated as (W (p)−
W (0))/W (0), so it will be the relative difference of the cost of a non-selfish node in
the presence of a fraction p of selfish transactions and the cost of a non-selfish node
when there are no selfish transactions at all. This difference is low, meaning that the
presence of selfish nodes do not harm the efficiency of the non-selfish nodes. Note that
this difference is small for all reasonable values of p, but even for the larger simulated
values of p, the difference is still less than 25%. An interesting phenomenon, as shown
in the same graph, is that the average cost increase imposed on the non-greedy nodes
may actually be negative. For low values of α, just a small fraction of the transactions
under S0 will share the approved tips with the transactions under S1. This fraction
of transactions will approve overcrowded tips, and will have their costs increased. All
the other transactions under S0 will have their sites less crowded, since an increase
in S1 will mean a decrease in competition over these transactions. Finally, on average,
the honest nodes will have their costs decreased.
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Figure 8: Costs (a) and gain (b) of the strategy S1 over S0; for α = 0.5.
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Figure 9: Relative cost increase of the transactions issued by the strategy S0 induced
by the presence of transactions emitted by the strategy S1.
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Figure 10: Costs (a) and gain (b) of the strategy S1 over S0; for α = 0.05.
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Figure 11: Costs (a) and gain (b) of the strategy S1 over S0; for α = 1.
Figures 10 and 11 are analogous to the first figures, for other values of α and λh;
part (a) of each figure represents average costs and part (b) absolute gains.
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5 Conclusions and future work
In the first part of this paper, we prove the existence of (“almost symmetric”) Nash
equilibria for a game in the tangle where a part of players tries to optimise their
attachment strategies. In the second part of the paper, we numerically determine,
for a simple space strategy and some range of parameters, where these equilibria are
located.
Our results show that the studied selfish strategy outperform the non-selfish ones
by a reasonable order of magnitude. The data show a 25% (in the most extreme
scenario) difference in the nodes gains, which in some situations, may be large enough.
Nevertheless, the computational cost of a selfish strategy is intrinsically larger than
the computational cost of the non-selfish strategies, since the selfish strategy uses the
probability distribution of the tips, which is costly to calculate for a random walk
with backtracking. They will also have to monitor the tangle, to know its parameters
(like λ, h etc) and act accordingly. Also, even a extreme scenario, where almost half
of the transactions were issued by a selfish node, is not enough to harm the non-selfish
ones in a meaningful way.
On the other hand, our results raise further questions. The obtained data exhibit
a deep qualitative dependence on the parameter α of the simulation. This parameter
is related to the randomness of the random walk: a low α implies a high random-
ness; a higher α implies a low randomness, meaning that the walk will be almost
deterministic. Further simulations will be done in order to study the effect of that
variable in the equilibria. Also, we only studied equilibria for a given cost, relative to
the probability of confirmation of the transactions in a certain interval of time. Since
this probability depends heavily on the interval of time chosen (because the proba-
bility distribution of the confirmations is far from uniform), another time intervals,
that will have another practical meaning, must be analysed.
Finally, the equilibrium in the multidimensional strategy space should be studied
in a more quantitative and analytic way, since it should depend strongly on α and p;
and until now it was studied in just a narrow range of parameters. Further research
will also be done in order to optimise the default tip selection strategy in a way that
minimises this cost imposed by the selfish strategies. Through implementing research
methods and techniques from the cross-reactive fields of measure theory, game theory,
and graph theory, progress towards resolving the tangle-related open problems has
been well under way and will continue to be under investigation.
As already mentioned, in this paper we consider only “selfish” players, i.e., those
who only care about their own costs but still want to use the network in a legitimate
way. We do not consider at all the case when there are “malicious” ones, i.e., those
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who want to disrupt the network even at a cost to themselves. We are going to treat
several types of attacks against the network in the subsequent papers. Some preview
of this ongoing work is available in [21].
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